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In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process
in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the
payoﬀ functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity
by one unit as long as this leads to higher proﬁts. We show that
despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process
converges to a collusive outcome.
JEL— classiﬁcation numbers: C72, L13.
∗We thank seminar audiences at the Stockholm School of Economics, Tilburg Univer-
sity, University of Amsterdam (Tinbergen Institute), the Institute for Advanced Studies,
Vienna, Texas A&M, Royal Holloway, and Humboldt, and in particular Tilman B¨ orgers,
Ulrich Kamecke, Georg N¨ o l d e k e ,R o yR a d n e r ,K l a u sR i t z b e r g e r ,a n dJ ¨ orgen Weibull for
helpful comments. The ﬁrst author ackowledges ﬁnancial support from DFG grant Hu
787/1-1.
†Adenauerallee 24, 53113 Bonn, Germany, E—mail: oechssler@uni-bonn.de1 Introduction
In this note we consider a very simple learning process, which we call trial &
error learning. The process is simple in two ways. First, it requires a very low
cognitive eﬀort of players. And second, it does not require any information
about the payoﬀ function of the game. It works as follows. Players choose
their strategies from a ﬁnite one—dimensional grid. Typical examples include
prices, quantities, expenditures and so on. Everytime players change their
strategy by one grid point, they check whether this increases or a decreases
payoﬀs. If it increases payoﬀs, the movement in this direction is continued.
If it does not, the reverse direction is taken.
We study the consequences of this learning process in the context of a
standard Cournot oligopoly. Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that trial &
error learning yields a collusive outcome.1 We prove this result analytically
for the duopoly case. With simulations we demonstrate that the result is
robust to the introduction of more ﬁrms and slight modiﬁcations of the
learning rule.
This result seems remarkable as players cannot observe the actions of
their opponents. Thus, there is no basis for any coordination or punishing
device. The result is also remarkable as practically all learning processes
in the literature converge to the (unique) Cournot—Nash equilibrium of the
game if they converge. This holds for best reply learning (Cournot, 1838),
ﬁctitious play, evolutionary dynamics like the replicator dynamics, gradi-
ent learning (Arrow and Hurwicz, 1960), or more generally for the class of
adaptive learning processes (Milgrom and Roberts, 1991). One interesting
exception is a simple imitation process, which has been shown to converge
to the competitive outcome (Vega—Redondo, 1997).
We do not know of any previous analysis of such trial & error learning
processes. Probably most closely related is gradient learning (Arrow and
Hurwicz, 1960), which requires, however, much more information. Trial &
error learning could be considered a particular form of learning direction
1By collusive outcome we mean an outcome on the Pareto frontier.
1theory (Selten and Buchta, 1998). This theory assumes that players have a
model which allows them to conclude in which direction better actions can
be found. In the absence of information about demand and cost conditions,
one interpretation is that the right direction can be found by determining
which direction was successful last period.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
introduces the learning rule and presents the main theoretical result. Section
3 contains the simulation results. In the concluding Section 4 we discuss
some experimental evidence.
2 Trial & error learning
Consider a standard Cournot oligopoly with n ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm may choose
outputs from a ﬁnite grid
Γ := {0,δ,2δ,...,vδ}
for some arbitrarily small grid size δ > 0a n dv ∈ N large enough. Inverse
demand, p(Q) ≥ 0,Q=
Pn
i=1qi is assumed to satisfy p0 < 0a n dp0+2p00Q<
0. Note that the latter assumption is weaker than requiring concavity of
demand.
Firm i’s cost function Ci(qi) is increasing and weakly convex, that is,
C0
i > 0a n dC00
i ≥ 0. Furthermore, we assume that for all i there exists a ﬁnite
Q such that p(Q)=C0
i(0). In particular, this is satisﬁed if there is a ﬁnite Q
such that the price becomes zero. To avoid a monopolized market we assume
that each ﬁrm’s monopoly price, pm
i , is larger than the minimal marginal cost
of each ﬁrm, pm
i >C 0
j(0), for all i and j.L e tΠi(q1,...,qn)=p(Q)qi −Ci(qi)
denote proﬁto fﬁrm i.
Next, let us deﬁne the set of collusive outcomes (i.e. the Pareto frontier)
(
qc ∈ Rn
+ : qc =a r gm a x
n X
i=1
λi (p(Q)qi − Ci(qi)),λi ≥ 0, some λj > 0
)
.
The joint proﬁt maximum is found by setting λi = 1, for all i.
2We assume that players behave according to the following trial & error
learning process
qt






















6=0 . 2 Otherwise st
i =+ 1,0, or −1, each with




This formalizes the idea that a direction (one grid point up or down)
that has proved successful last period is repeated again this period.3 If the
change in proﬁts or the change in quantities was zero, the quantity either
remains the same, is increased by one unit or is decreased by one unit, each
with positive probability.
Note that neither information about other ﬁrms’ demand or cost func-
tion, nor information about their past actions, nor information about one’s
own demand or cost functions are required for the trial & error process to
work.
Each plausible learning process should be subject to some noise as in-
dividuals generally make mistakes in the execution of their strategies or
(more or less) systematically try out diﬀerent actions. We assume there-
fore that with some small probability ε > 0 each ﬁrm chooses an arbitrary
direction of change st
i (each possible direction is chosen with some ﬁxed,
positive probability). At the cost of some more cumbersome notation we
could equally assume that this probability is diﬀerent for each ﬁrm and/or
time period or that deviations to quantities which are further away than one
grid point are possible.
Our assumptions deﬁne a Markov process on the ﬁnite state space Γn ×
{−1,0,1}n,w h e r eas t a t ei sg i v e nb y( qt,st). For ε > 0t h ep r o c e s si s
irreducible and, therefore, has a unique stationary distribution. Formally,
2Note that the upper bound vδ can never be reached if v large enough.
3The restriction to movements of one grid point may be justiﬁed by convex adjustment
costs, which can make it optimal to adjust in very small steps.
3we consider the limit distribution for ε → 0. For ε = 0 the process may
have several absorbing sets.4 By standard arguments (see e.g. Samuelson,
1994) only the members of absorbing sets of the unperturbed process can
appear in the support of the limit distribution. In this paper we will speak of
convergence to some point q if all states q0, which have positive probability
under the limit distribution, are close to q in the sense that kq− q0k is of
the order of the grid size δ, i.e. kq − q0k = O(δ). In other words, by letting
the grid size δ go to zero the distance from any point in a limit cycle to q
can be made arbitrarily small.
Theorem 1 For a duopoly the trial & error process converges to a collusive
outcome qc. If cost functions are identical, C1(·)=C2(·), then it converges
to the joint proﬁt maximizing outcome.
Proof. We use the notation ↓↑ to indicate that ﬁrm 1 decreases its quantity
and ﬁrm 2 increases its quantity. Analogously, for ↑↓,↑↑ and ↓↓.L e tu sﬁrst
consider the change in individual proﬁts due to ↑↑.
∆Πi(↑↑)=( qi + δ)p(q1 + q2 +2 δ) − qip(q1 + q2) − Ci(qi + δ)+Ci(qi).
We can now implicitly deﬁne two functions zi(qi), i = 1,2b y
1
δ
∆Πi(↑↑)(qi,z i(qi)) ≡ 0. (2)
We call zi(qi)t h ei m p r o v e m e n tf r o n t i e rf o rﬁrm i since for all qj <z i(qi)
(qj >z i(qi)) proﬁts of ﬁrm i increase (decrease) when both ﬁrms raise their
quantities. Similarly, we can derive an improvement frontier for ∆Πi(↓↓)=
0, which is one grid point above andto the right of the curve for ∆Πi(↑↑)=0 .







4A set of states is called absorbing if there is zero probability to exit the set and a
positive probability of moving from any state in the set to any other state in the set in
ﬁnite time.
4or equivalently,
p(qi + zi(qi)) + 2qip0(qi + zi(qi))− C0
i(qi)=0 . (4)




Next, we deﬁne curves r1 and r2 in the (q1,q 2) space along which price equals
marginal costs for ﬁrm i, i.e.
p(qi + ri(qi))− C0
i(qi) ≡ 0. (6)




(ii) ri(0) is ﬁnite because we have assumed that there exists a ﬁnite Q such
that p(Q)=C0
i(0). Comparing (4) and (6) shows that (iii) zi(0) = ri(0) and
(iv) ri(qi) >z i(qi)f o rqi > 0.
Next, we show that there exists a unique intersection P1 of the two
improvement frontiers z1 and z2 in the interior. Our assumption that pm
i >
C0
j(0), for all i and j, guarantees that qm
i <r j(0) = zj(0). Let q∗
i be deﬁned
by zi(q∗
i ) = 0. Since qm
i is deﬁned by ∂Πi/∂qi =0 ,w h e r e a sq∗
i is given by




i <z j(0). This together with (5) implies that P1 exists in the interior and
is unique (as shown in Figure 1).
[insert Figure 1 about here]
We claim that P1 corresponds to some qc. To see this, note that collusion






=0 . ( 7 )
5Table 1: Movements in t + 1
Movement in t
Region ↑↑ ↑↓ ↓↑ ↓↓
A ↑↑ ↑↑ ↑↑ ↑↑
B ↓↓ ↑↑ ↑↑ ↓↓
C ↓↑ ↑↑ ↑↑ ↓↑
D ↑↓ ↑↑ ↑↑ ↑↓
L0 ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓ ↓↓
L1 ↑↓ ↑↓ ↑↓ ↑↓
L2 ↓↓ ↑↓ ↑↓ ↓↓
L3 ↓↓ ↓↑ ↓↑ ↓↓
L4 ↓↑ ↓↑ ↓↑ ↓↑







that is, if qip0(Q)=λjqjp0(Q)o ri fqi = λjqj. Hence, there always exists some
λj such that both conditions are equivalent. Clearly, if costs are symmetric,
the solutions to (3) and (7) are symmetric, and hence (8) holds for λj =
1.T h u s ,f o r δ → 0 the improvement frontiers intersect at the joint proﬁt
maximum.
Taken together those facts deﬁnetheshapes of the fourcurves, r1,r 2,z 1,z 2.
Figure 1 shows a typical constellation. Note that P2,P 3, and P4 need not
necessarily exist.
We can now deﬁne nine subsets of the quantity space (some of which
might be empty) as shown in Figure 1.I n r e g i o n s L0 through L4 at least
one ﬁrm makes a loss.
For each region we can determine the transitions as shown in Table 1.
For example, in regions A through D ↑↓ and ↓↑ are followed by ↑↑ because
∆p =0a n dΠi > 0. In region L0 all movements result in ↓↓ as price is
below marginal cost for both ﬁrms. In region L4 all movements result in ↓↑
since for ﬁrm 1 price is below marginal cost, whereas ﬁrm 2 is still below its
6improvement frontier. All other entries in Table 1 can be derived similarly.
Note in particular that nowhere in regions B and C (B and D)t h em o v e m e n t s
↓↑ (↑↓) are possible. Hence, the process in regions B, C,a n dD weakly moves
in the direction of the diagonal.
Applying Table 1 repeatedly it can be seen that after at most two steps
in each region directions are given as indicated by the arrows in Figure 1,
namely, always decreasing in regions B and L0, and always increasing in
region A.I n r e g i o n s C and D quantities are zigzagging in the direction
of region B.I n r e g i o n s L2 and L3 both indicated directions are possible
depending on the starting condition.
Considering the dynamics in Figure 1 it is clear that the only candidates
for absorbing sets are limit cycles around one of the intersections P1 through
P4. Especially, it can be checked easily that no cycles of length two between
regions B and C or between regions B and D are possible. Clearly, P1 is a
sink of the dynamics whereas P2, P3,a n dP4 are saddles. The latter are not
stable to noise which can always put the process into region B and thus in
the basin of attraction of P1. The sink P1, however, is robust to noise. Thus,
for ε small the process will be almost always in an absorbing set around P1.
The maximum distance between any point q0 in such an absorbing set and
qc is bounded by the fact that after at most two transitions inside each
region the directions are as indicated by the arrows in Figure 1.T h u s ,t h e
distance between qc and q0 is of the order of δ.
Remark 1 I ft h ec o s tf u n c t i o n sa r el i n e a ra n dt h es a m ef o rb o t hﬁrms,
then the intersection points P2, P3,a n dP4 do not exist since in this case
dri(qi)
dqi = −1. Therefore, global convergence to the neighborhood of P1 is
assured even without noise.
The intuition for Theorem 1 is the following. It is relatively easy to
see why ﬁrms which are perfectly aligned will move to a collusive outcome.
Suppose two symmetric ﬁrms start from some output q1 = q2 larger than
the collusive outcome. If both decrease their quantity, both increase their
proﬁts and will continue to do so until the collusive outcome is reached.
7This example also shows why the Cournot outcome is not a rest point of
our process. Once ﬁrms surpass the collusive outcome, proﬁts are lowered
by further reductions in quantities. Hence, both ﬁrms will turn and start
jumping around the collusive outcome. In fact, the typical cycle which
emerges in simulations consists of both ﬁr m sm o v i n gi ns t e p( qc − δ,qc −
δ) → (qc,qc) → (qc + δ,qc + δ) → (qc,qc) → (qc − δ,qc − δ),5 though more
complicated patterns are possible.
The question then arises why ﬁrms which start from arbitrary initial
quantities and directions of change (s0
i), could become perfectly aligned.
Suppose two ﬁrms with diﬀerent quantities move downwards. They will
continue to do so until at least one ﬁrm’s proﬁt decreases. If ﬁrms are
not too close together, it is always the ﬁrm with the smaller output which
hits this boundary ﬁrst. This is because the ﬁrm selling the higher quantity
gains more from the increase in price. Thus, while the ﬁrm with lower output
already moves upwards, the other ﬁrm continues to move downwards thereby
decreasing the distance between the ﬁrms by 2 grid points. Similarly, when
moving upwards the ﬁrm with higher output hits the boundary ﬁrst. Thus,
there is a general tendency to equalize quantities. In terms of Figure 1 ﬁrms
generally move to the diagonal. Once on the diagonal, the argument of the
previous paragraph applies.
Finally, consider a parallel to the conjectural variations model (Hicks,
1935). In this model when the conjectural derivative is +1, the equilibrium
conditions are identical to our equation (3). Note, however, that conjectural
variations models exogenously ﬁx the conjectural derivative to +1,w h i l e
with our learning process (3) results endogenously.
3 Simulations results
In order to check whether Theorem 1 is simply an artefact of our assump-
tions, we ran computer simulations to assess its robustness.6 In particular,
5This cycle also exists with more than two ﬁrms.
6The programming was done in Turbo Pascal. The source code is available from the
authors upon request.
8we simulated oligopolies with up to 10 ﬁrms and various functional forms
both, for symmetric and for asymmetric ﬁrms. Further, we analyzed two
modiﬁcations of the learning rule.
3.1 n—ﬁrm oligopolies
The most important result from the simulations is that the prediction of
Theorem 1 also holds for more than two ﬁrms. We simulated oligopolies with
n =2 ,...,10 ﬁrms and for three functional forms, linear demand and cost,
linear demand and quadratic cost, and quadratic demand and linear cost.7
In all simulations with symmetric ﬁrms, play converged to the joint proﬁt
maximizing outcome.8 With cost asymmetries a Pareto eﬃcient outcome
was reached.
Result In simulations, the trial & error process with noise converged glob-
ally to the collusive outcome qc in all cases. When cost functions were
identical, C1(·)=C2(·), it converged to the joint proﬁt maximizing
outcome.
As pointed out above without noise the process can get stuck in limit
cycles around intersection points P which are far away from Pareto eﬃcient
outcomes. To see how large the proportion of such limit cycles is for diﬀerent
numbers of ﬁrms we also ran simulations without noise. Table 2 shows the
average percentage of limit cycles in 10,000 simulations with random starting
quantities for oligopolies with linear demand and cost.
As expected, the number of limit cycles increases with the number of
ﬁrms (and therefore with the number of possible intersection points P).
Numerical values for quadratic speciﬁcations are similar. No matter how
7The functional forms used for symmetric ﬁrms were the following: (a) Πi =( 1 .1 −
q1−q2)qi − 0.1qi;( b )Πi =( 1− q1−q2)qi − (qi)
2;( c )Πi =( 1 .1 − (q1−q2)
2)qi − 0.1qi. For
asymmetric ﬁrms, diﬀerent cost parameters were employed. The grid size was in all cases
δ =0 .001. Initial quantities were random, but restricted to qi < 1. The noise was modelled
such that there is a probability ε =1 /500 for each ﬁrm in each period that s
t
i is chosen
with equal probabilities form {−1,0,1}.
8Here again, convergence to q means convergence to a limit cycle which is close to q.
9Table 2: Percentage of limit cycles
Numer of ﬁr m s 23456 7 8 910
Limit cycles in % 0 2.65 2.69 7.34 7.64 11.59 12.70 17.84 20.16
large the number of limit cycles, with noise play always converged to the
collusive outcome.
3.2 Modiﬁcations of the learning rule
One property of our trial & error process is that all ﬁrms move with the same
step size δ. What happens if ﬁrms have diﬀerent step sizes δi?C o n s i d e r
for example a symmetric oligopoly with constant marginal cost in which one
ﬁrm’s step size is twice that of the other ﬁrms. What happens in simulations
is that total output still converges to the joint proﬁt maximum. However,
the distribution of output changes: the ﬁrm with the larger step size has
twice the output share of the other ﬁrms. The intuition is that from the
perspective of the remaining ﬁrms the ﬁrst ﬁrms moves and behaves like
two ﬁrms which are perfectly aligned. In fact, we obtained this result for
up to 10 ﬁrms, and with both, linear and quadratic demand. The factor
k by which one ﬁrm’s step size is multiplied is arbitrary – the ﬁrst ﬁrm
w i l le n du pw i t hk times the shares of the other ﬁrms. Even with quadratic
cost there is convergence to some Pareto eﬃcient outcome in which ﬁrms
produce diﬀerent quantities (also if costs are asymmetric).
A second feature of our learning process is that only the direction of
movement but not the step size is inﬂuenced by the change in proﬁts. We
ran simulations where instead of using constant step size δ we used an en-









The constant c served to avoid division by zero, and d was chosen to be
even in order to avoid changes in sign.9 Again we found convergence to a
9For c we chose values between 0.1 and 1, and for d between 2 and 8.
10collusive outcome.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this note we studied a trial & error learning process which converges to a
collusive outcome. This result may be somewhat surprising as players in our
setting are totally ignorant of the other players; they do even not realize that
they are playing a game. In fact, they do not have to know their own payoﬀ
function. Nevertheless, they manage to coordinate on a collusive outcome
endogenously.
We believe that the trial & error process has some intuitive appeal. In
particular, in situations in which players are not familiar with the payoﬀ
structure of the game it seems plausible that they adjust cautiously in a
direction that has proved to be successful. Ultimatively, it is an empirical
question whether players behave according to such a process or not.
There is some experimental evidence, both on the individual level and on
the aggregate level. On the individual level Huck, Normann, and Oechssler
(1999) show that the direction of change is predicted correctly by the trial
& error process for 80% of subjects’ choices. However, since the experiment
was not designed to test trial & error learning in particular,10 subjects were
not constrained to change their quantity by one grid point only and mostly
adjusted by more. Secondly, the theory requires that all subjects play ac-
cording to the rule. If only some subjects violate it occasionally, one cannot
expect convergence to the theoretical prediction any more. Hence, it is not
surprising that total quantities were not even close to the collusive outcome.
On the aggregate level several other studies found substantial support for a
tendency toward collusion but mostly in duopoly cases (see Holt, 1995, for
an overview).
An interesting question for further research is to identify a general class
of games where trial & error learning yields Pareto eﬃciency. We have found
some examples where this might work. For instance, trial & error learning
10Rather, the experimental results lead us to analyze the trail & error process.
11yields cooperation in a ﬁnite mixed extension of the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
where players move on a probability grid and receive expected payoﬀs.11
As pointed out in the Introduction the Cournot outcome is a very robust
prediction as practically all known learning processes converge to it. Any
imaginative reader is sure to ﬁnd modiﬁcations of our trail & error learning
rule which do so as well. However, the interesting fact is that there are
plausible learning processes which do not converge to the Cournot outcome.
References
[1] Arrow, K.J., and Hurwicz, L. (1960), “Stability of the Gradient Process
in n—Person Games”, Journal of the Society of Industrial and Applied
Mathematics, 8, 280-294.
[2] Cournot, A. (1838), Reserches sur les Principles Mathematiques de la
Theorie des Richesses, Paris: Hachette, translated as Research into the
Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth, New York: Kelley,
1960.
[3] Hicks, J.R. (1935), “Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of
Monopoly”, Econometrica, 3, 1—20.
[4] Holt, C. (1995), “Industrial Organization: A Survey of Labratory Re-
sults”, in: The Handbook of Experimental Economics (J. Kagel and A.
Roth, eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
[ 5 ]H u c k ,S . ,N o r m a n n ,H . ,a n dO e c h s s l e r ,J .( 1999), “Learning in Cournot
Oligopoly: An Experiment”, Economic Journal, 109, C80-C95.
[6] Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1991), “Adaptive and Sophisticated Learn-
ing in Normal Form Games”, Games and Economic Behavior,3 ,8 2 - 100.
[7] Samuelson, L. (1994), “Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative
Best Replies”, Journal of Economic Theory, 64, 35-65.
11This example has been suggested by J¨ orgen Weibull.
12[8] Selten, R. and Buchta, J. (1998), “Experimental Sealed Bid First Price
Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions”, in Games and Human
Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport (D. Budescu, I. Erev,
and R. Zwick, eds.) Lawrenz Erlaaum Ass., Mahwak, NJ.






            z1(q1)   
 




  L2 
                      




  D 
     L0 
            P4                 r2(q2)      
 
         P 1     B       z2(q2) 
 
         A 
                C       L3 
                    P3 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
q2 
L1 
L4
q1 
14